examine this process in the perspective of Prometheus Unbound by dramatizing the resurrection of the Understanding; the raising of the Christ in both In Memoriam and Saul is achieved by the same self-revelatory suffering that frees Prometheus. Tennyson moves between hope and despair, each cycle more and more intense, until he envisions the dead Hallam resurrected with the living Christ and feels that all "the truths that never can be proved" are proved as "we close with all we loved/And all we flow from, soul in soul" (In Memoriam, CXX1X); in Kantian terms, phenomenal appearance has fallen away to reveal a glimpse of noumenal realiry. In Saul, after an upward spiralling between reason and faith, the individual ego attains its "unity of Apperception" and thence for an instant recognizes its fusion with the noumenal reality essential to all things.
Browning is actually a more complete idealist than Tennyson, for he admits of no objectivity at all in that one eternal moment of conversion, even though he shows that objectivity and the world of appearance more or less retum as the ego slips back into the limitations of normal, everyday consciousness. Whereas for Browning the ego can fuse with reality in the moment of conversion, for Tennyson ultimate reality may be glimpsed now only as a vision, and not fully attained until some future time. For Tennyson there is even at the deepest point of penetration into the self an inescapable tension between the transcending subject and the existential personality, and thus a necessary separation between the striver and the goal. For both Browning and Tennyson the journey of penetration, which has culminated in either complete transcendence or at least a glimpse of impending reality, entails heightened consciousness for the ego on its return to normal life. The reward is an increased ability to sense the transcendent reality behind all individual perceptions, to synthesize the fragmentary objects of everyday consciousness. Thus the resultant condition of Browning's David, emerging fresh from his union with the essential Saul, is sustained conversion:
Anon at the dawn, all that trouble had withered from earthNot so much, but I saw it die out in the day's tender birch; In the gathered intensity brought to the grey of the hills;
In the shuddering forests' new awe; in the sudden wind-thrills; In the startled wild beasts that bore off, each with eye sidling srill Though averted with wonder and dread; in the birds stiff and chill That rose heavily, as I approached them, made stupid with awe! E'en the serpent that slid away silent.-he felt the new Law. The same stared in the white humid faces upturned by the flowers;
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The same worked in the heart of the cedar, and moved the vine-bowers; And the little brooks witnessing murmured, persistent and low, With their obstinate, all but hushed voices-"E'en so, it is so!" (Saul, XIX) Matthew Arnold rejects the assertion that the "outer world" (both as physical and as conceptual phenomena) exists only in relation to a transcendental power which focuses through a perceiving ego. Thus he does not, like Shelley, Coleridge, Tennyson, and Browning, write poetry in which all setting, characters, and events serve to dramatize the structure and function of the ego. He does not imagine, for example, that the appearance of the woods, hills, and animals in his poem depends upon the perceiving consciousness of the hero, whose movement through them is correlative to the subject ego's penetration into itself as objective envelopment. For Arnold, rather than the ego transforming-even determining-the appearance of the" outer world," quite the reverse is true: the ego is impinged upon by that outer reality which it foolishly, tragically, pretends to dominate. Arnold insists that there is an objective reality over which man's will has no control-an amoral Nature which is not man's friend nor his foe nor in any way cognizant of him, and which subjects him to the rules of change and death. While recognizing that it is natural for man to persist in the illusion that he can understand or even contain "reality," Arnold reveals a world thoroughly independent of the "dreams" which constitute human consciousness. He berates Clough for his unavailing struggle to contain all reality within some recognizable structure of his own ego:
You ask me in what I think or have thought you going wrong: in this: that you would never take your assiette as something determined fmal and unchangeable for YOll and proceed to work away on the basis of that: but were always poking and patching and cobbling at the assiette itself-could never finally, as it seemed-"resolve to be thyself'-but were looking for this and that experience, and doubting whether you ought not to adopt this or that mode of being of persons qui ne vous valaient pas because it might possibly be nearer the truth than your own: you had no reason for thinking it was, but it might be-and so you would try to adapt yourself to it,l Arnold tries to show this idealist par excellence that there is a definite stance to be assumed, a position to be held: "You are too content to fluctuate-to be ever learning, never coming to the knowledge of the truth. This is why, with you, I feel it necessary to stiffen myself-and hold fast my rudder.'" Arnold seeks a point of balance between activity and repose.
Most of his poems deal with an individual whose stance is already determined; they merely defme that stance and its implications. Arnold's lonely individual is denied the idealist potentiality of joining "soul in soul," of joining (in the manner of Browning and Tennyson) with a noumenal reality essential to all men. In "A Republican Friend" the idealist who subordinates outer reality to the human will is portrayed as a man of social action who believes he can make a better world; but the narrator in the poem reduces this social idealist to a political activist: one who pretends foolishly that he can strive for a utopian goal untainted by the "lust, avarice, envy" of worldly existence. Thus Arnold's individual, with the perspective of this narrator, makes his first step in the process of self-consciousness, or rather of "reality"-consciousness: withdrawal from society. This step is more or less complete before the time of the poem. Arnold's individual sympathizes with the purposes of "A Republican Friend," saying, "I am yours, and what you feel I share," 3 but at the same time admits that activism, even if admirable, is delusive. He steps away from his friend (p. 7)-aS from the activist self of his own past- Recognizing the idealist arrogance of that other self, he admits that human beliefs are illusory and human efforts fruitless. Yet it is only as double-self that he is human; man's life must circle paradoxically between resolute withdrawal and credulous activism, for even in making the efFort to cut away he increases the tension with his existence as foolish hero. Seduced into a desire to rejoin, to receive the bodily investment of, the worldly self, he must increase the puritanical vigour of his rejection. Thus Arnold's individual is profoundly bo;)emian (p. 7), intensely antibourgeois, sharing thoroughly the despite republicans hold for But he insists that the republicans, in freeing themselves from the somnolent blindness of ordinary men, pretend far too much vision. How can they be so foolish as to believe they can acquire sure knowledge about and then impose changes upon complex world realities? "To an ambitious friend" he says (p. 47 Is no concern of ours;
and he warns that such social buzzing falls far below life's better task, the crowning of Eugenia's hair with rose garlands. Yet Arnold does not make this point final-as does the idealist Browning of "Love among the Ruins"; for fair Eugenia might very well be scornful, and then it would be best to consider what time and change will do to her beaury and your desire. Thus idealist absolutes are as impossible in the romantic sphere as in the political. For Arnold the discovery of reality is the discovery of self vis il vis the outer world; it comes at a point of equilibrium between, on the one hand, engagement in sociery, in love, in ideals and, on the other, isolation from action, from passion, from principle, indeed, from life itself. Neither the self nor the outer world are noumena which can be seen into or, except in the most limited and exterior manner, understood; and this fact can force man either to accept oversimplified forms (illusions) in place of reality, or to despair of imposing upon complex existence any forms whatsoever. At a point of equilibrium man must develop the humiliry and the strength to "hold his rudder fast" against winds that would blow him to either side.
King Mycerinus, with only six years to live, decides his notions of religion and justice are illusory forms, "mere phantoms of man's selftormenting heart," and abandons them, along with the entire context of social existence, to fmd what meagre realiry he can in "the silence of the groves and woods" (p. 10). His withdrawal is to be neither a retirement nor an escape, but a modest ailirmation. In the woods, however, he enters upon an endless cycle of satiation and desire, thus replacing the illusions of social activism and religious belief with those of hedonist indulgence. There, as before, he discovers that every perceived phenomenon, every presumed reality, disappears precisely at the instant of possession-that every "feast" insofar as it occurs is gone, leaving no sustaining after taste. It is at this point that Mycerinus, having learned the full lesson about idealist participation, might be imagined to feel the need for a more ultimate withdrawal (p. II).
It may be that sometimes his wondering soul
From the loud joyful laughter of his lips Might shrink half startled, like a guilty man
Who wrestles with a dream; as some pale shape
Gliding half hidden through the dusky sterns, Would thrust a hand before the lifted bowl, Whispering: A little space. and thou art mine! Thus "it may be" that there is no ultimate withdrawal save death, and that the King does well to continue in sensual indulgence, struggling to confine beneath smooth brow and clear laugh his fear of that sole reality. Or "it may be" that for the brief interval before death, even as the feasting continues, Mycerinus pauses inwardly to "take measure of his soul," and is thereby "calm' d, ennobled, comforted, sustain' d." In the darkness, peering at the noumenon of self, the poet cannot assert anything definite. All he can do is chronicle from a distance Mycerinus' problem, and speculate on the existence of a solution. The poem ends in mystery, as Arnold represents the impossibility of narrator and audience ever discovering anything about noumenal Mycerinus-the impossibility of the ego ever discovering anything essential Mycerinus' inward projection of withdrawal itself provides the point of view in "A Modern Sappho." The narrator, Sappho, personifies that subject ego which struggles to hold fast the rudder, now against the force of participation and later against the force of death. At the moment the force of participation, her lover, dominates the entire ego; Sappho (helpless at the helm, as it were) must sit resolutely longing for the proper balance. The lover, like "a republican friend," and like Mycerinus engaged in fleeting pleasures, is now impassioned over the world of illusion: the young and sensuous other woman. Sappho, in torture, awaits the day when time will conquer this love, allowing her hero to be drawn to her.
Then, dominating, she may effeet for the entire ego an interval of essential equilibrium between the passion of life and the dissolution of death. The torturing mystery lies in the question whether or not such an interval can exist; can there be before death any life other than that of a sensual, passionate, self-deluded lover? For it is possible that her very longing is in its violence an uncontrollable impulsion toward death, and that the This theme is treated more profoundly in "Tristram and Iseult," for which "A Modem Sappho" may have been a preliminary sketch. Here Tristram symbolizes the participative ego. He is involved with two Iseults, neither of whom can fully receive his love-Iseult ofIreland can't because of her separation from him as wife of King Marc, and Iseult of Brittany can't because Tristram is blinded to her by his love for Iseult of Ireland. The fIrst two parts of the poem tell of Tristram' s sickness from his love for the unattainable Iseult of Ireland; he dies blinded by the "flooding moonlight" of her beauty. In this portion of the poem Iseult of Brittany is mentioned repeatedly in Tristram's love ravings, but only as the Iseult he does not want, despite her admitted purity and goodness. Part Three is devoted to Iseult of Brittany, who, having loved the living Tristram in vain, now survives him. Before, her presence in the poem was covert, but now it is clear that she has been the implicit centre for the poet's sympathy. She is revealed as precisely that inward projection of withdrawal personifIed by Sappho. Thus the story !seult tells the children at the end of the poem is the wish fulfillment of Sappho's plea that "life" and the "world" "Crown, crown him quickly, and leave him for me!" !seult envisions herself as Vivian contriving to cast a spell on the old, but still passionate, magician Merlin, and trapping him fast within her 'Idaisied circle."
The longings ofSappho and Iseult of Brittany represent an inward pull toward stoical control without which the "lover," drawing away into "life" and the "world," would dash himself to pieces-as, indeed, Tristram does. But this pull toward control may result not simply in the inhibition but also in the destruction of the participating self, may effect a virtual suicide. The question is how much force the withdrawing self must exercise in order to restrain the idealist who would be ruthless destroyer of the total ego. Undercurrent, therefore, to the controlled equilibrium envisioned by Sappho and Iseult-Vivian, is the threat of the loved hero's imprisonment or even murder by the femm e fatale.
The suicide in its most basic form is evident in "The Sick King in Bokhara." Identifying a part of himself with a man who seeks the punishment of death for such sins as are common to all humanity, the King rules: "ifhe seek to fiy, give way, / Hinder him not, but let him go"; then the King "softly" casts the first stone, as the sinner, looking up at him with joy, stays to embrace his execution. The King makes the extraordinary command that the corpse be brought to him; but his Vizier, at a loss to understand such sympathy for strangers, reminds him of the dignity of kingship, and of the law commanding that such a man be stoned "even were he thine own mother's son." In thus counselling the King, the Vizier perceives that the executed sinner is in a sense the King himself, that the King is similarly human. The King's sickness is his inability to escape from exactly that awareness; if he could harken to the Vizier and thus stoically ignore his disease of humanity, he could have health, release from tension. The King struggles to hold a balance between the sinner who succumbed to his thirsts and the Vizier who, being old, need not contend with any desire. If all three represent divisions of the human spirit, the final stanzas epitomize the proper action of the will in holding a firm balance between the cold indifference of reason and the consuming life of passion. The King concludes (pp. 94-5), "What I would, I cannot do," but "what I can do, that I will": A similar "suicide"-the killing, or at least abandonment, of the social self by the withdrawing self-is effected by the wine of "The World and the Quietist," by "The Strayed Reveller," and by the self-imposed estrangement, the bohemianism, of "The Forsaken Merman" and "The Neckan." "The Scholar Gypsy" seems to achieve an equilibrium by abandoning his participating self; and yet, insofar as he retreats from society, the question arises does he, did he ever, exist at all? Arnold's most profound treatment of this theme is "Empedocles on Etua." It is a mistake to read this poem simply as a direct comment on Arnold's age. "Empedocles" is no Victorian "Wasteland"-no bitter lament over the death of idealism, the impossibility of holding absolute values in this withering modern age--rather it is Arnold's interpretation of the tragedy implicit in human existence in every age. Society will always banish, or at least estrange, its just ruler, and, more important, the just ruler will always find it necessary to withdraw from society; insofar as he is honest and courageous he will destroy his activist self, obliterating the pretension and arrogance of idealism. As Arnold said to Clough, Empedocles says, "Know thyself," but in that very assertion inveighs against the Emersonian idealism which defines the inner self as part and parcel of all things elements is a transcendentalist assertion (and thus itself a valid idealism), as Empedocles hopes it is, or is instead an act of nihilistic futility. The answer cannot be determined, man cannot know that much about himself vis a vis outer reality.
The same theme is essential to "Sohrab and Rustum," where Arnold portrays the impact between the two impulses in its most violent form. The world-weary Rustum, now aware that it is his own son-his activist self-whom he has slain, repeats the pity of the "Sick King" for the dead sinner (p. 85) :
.. . rather would that It even I myself.
